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Appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Appellee") was not 
entitled to damages in this case. A valid, enforceable contract 
existed between Appellant and Appellee and, because Appellee 
breached the contract, it was improper to award Appellee damages 
under the contract. Moreover, because the relationship of the 
parties was governed by contract, and because the court 
specifically found that Appellee did not fulfill its obligations 
under the contract to direct and supervise the construction, it was 
improper to grant relief under a theory of unjust enrichment for 
Appellee's services in directing and supervising the construction. 
The Court also erred in failing to award Appellants their 
attorney fees incurred in successfully bringing a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's causes of action based on 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute and on the Construction Bond Statute. 
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Both statutes provide for an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. Finally, the trial court erred in awarding 
prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Prejudgment interest was 
not available because the amount of damages was unliquidated until 
judgment was entered. Post-judgment interest, if any, should have 
run from the date judgment was entered, not from the date the trial 
court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment. 
B. APPELLEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES EITHER ON THE 
CONTRACT OR UNDER A THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
1. Appellee Was Not Entitled to Damages Under the 
Contract. 
As discussed in the Brief of Appellant, Appellee was not 
entitled to damages under the contract because the trial court 
found that Appellee did not obtain evidence of insurance and did 
not perform his contractual obligation to direct and supervise the 
construction. (R. 217.) 
Is its Brief, Appellee has argued that it should have 
been paid for "pre-breach," or "previously-earned" contractor fees 
in the case of default during construction. (Brief of Appellee at 
13.) In fact, Appellee's failure to obtain insurance put Appellee 
in breach of the contract from the moment the contract was signed. 
There was no period of time, therefore, that was "pre-breach." 
Nevertheless, Appellee contends that the construction contract did 
not prohibit payment for pre-breach services, that the parties did 
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not intend such a result, that the contract should be construed 
against Appellants who drafted the agreement, and that the trial 
court was free to interpret the contract as allowing an award of 
"previously earned" contractor fees. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Appellee is 
correct on all these points, Appellee is still not entitled to 
damages under the contract because the trial court found that 
Appellee failed to adequately perform the services upon which 
compensation was contingent. In other words, regardless of how the 
damages provision is interpreted, Appellee is not entitled to 
enforce the contract because it was the breaching party. See, 
Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980) ("The rule in Utah 
is that to recover on a contract, a contractor must first establish 
his own performance [or] a valid excuse for his failure to 
perform."); Liddle v. Petty. 816 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Mont. 1991) (If 
one contracting party materially breaches the contract, the other 
is entitled to suspend his performance). 
Appellee was terminated because it failed to properly 
discharge its duties as general contractor to direct and supervise 
the construction. (R. 217.) Throughout its Brief, Appellee has 
admitted its breach for failure to obtain insurance, but it has 
utterly ignored the trial court's determination that Appellee 
breached its obligation to direct and supervise the construction. 
The trial court found Appellee had not only failed to obtain 
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insurance, but it failed to properly perform its services as 
general contractor, failed to spend sufficient time on the job, 
failed to take care of matters promptly as they arose, failed to 
move the work forward, failed to respond to questions concerning 
the construction and failed to give the project the kind of 
attention Appellee knew it required under the contract. (R. 801; 
R. 217,) The trial court concluded that these deficiencies 
constituted a material breach of the contract and that "the 
defendant was justified in terminating the relationship, 
terminating the contract." (R. 801.) The court also found that 
Appellants were not in breach of the contract in any way. 
Appellee failed to establish, and the trial court did not 
conclude that Appellee had "earned" any amount whatsoever from 
performing pre-breach services under the contract. In its Brief, 
Appellee has cited several entries in Appellants' log book that 
Appellee suggests are indications that Appellee provided some 
compensable service. Mr. Kurzet recorded that "there was good 
progress on framing, " and that he felt that "things were going 
okay." (R. 608-09.) Appellee is eager to step forward and claim 
credit for the progress that was made during the period of time he 
was general contractor. But, as discussed in Appellants' Brief, 
the progress on construction that was made during the period that 
Appellee was on the job was not due to Appellee's effort. (See 
Brief of Appellant at 26-29) . 
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been entitled to compensation for pre-termination services under 
the contract. 
2. Appellee Was Not Entitled to Recover Under a Theory 
of Uniust Enrichment. 
Recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment "presupposes 
that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Davies v. 
Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under Utah law, an 
award for unjust enrichment is usually not available when an 
enforceable contract exists. See, Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries. 
Inc. , 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). When an express 
construction contract exists, quantum meruit may be proper, if at 
all, only when a contractor is required to perform work outside the 
scope of the contract, or when a contractor justifiably ceases work 
or is unjustifiably terminated. Highland Const. Co. v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (dictum); 
Davies, 683 P. 2d at 1048 (dictum) . Appellee has cited no Utah law 
to support the notion that the remedy of unjust enrichment is 
available under the facts of this case. A valid contract existed 
between Appellants and Appellee and there are no circumstances that 
would invoke an exception to the rule and justify an award of 
unjust enrichment. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the theory of unjust enrichment 
were applicable here, it still would have been error here to award 
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not and could not base the award on the value of the benefit that 
Appellee actually conferred on Appellant. 
Appellee has contended that it is entitled to $5,500.00 
under an unjust enrichment theory for negotiating the purchase of 
lumber. Appellee argues that those services were not part of 
obtaining "competitive bids" as stated in the contract because the 
lumber, although not paid for, had already been delivered to the 
site. Appellee counted up the lumber, decided that the price was 
too high, and recommended that Appellants pay $5,500.00 less than 
the asking price. Appellee did not obtain the initial bid on the 
lumber because Appellee had not yet been hired as general 
contractor. There is very little difference, however, between 
obtaining a reasonable price based on competitive bids and 
obtaining a reasonable price from one supplier. The trial court 
did not find that such duties fell outside the scope of the 
contract. See Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
683 P.2d at 1048 (dictum that unjust enrichment doctrine might 
apply when work is outside the scope of contract) . Assuming 
Appellee saved Appellant $5,500.00, the service was one of 
Appellee's contractual duties. Appellee is not entitled to keep 
for himself the amount saved. 
Appellee has contended that fairness does not require 
"previously earned" compensation to be forfeited upon a breach of 
contract by Appellee. To illustrate, Appellee has offered a 
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failed to provide evidence of adequate insurance, but because it 
did not perform its duties as general contractor. Appellee's "pre-
termination services" were simply not adequately rendered and the 
trial court was correct in finding that Appellee breached the 
contract in that respect. Under the circumstances, fairness does 
not require that Appellee receive $10,000.00. Indeed, it would be 
unfair to those who eventually completed the job and to Appellants 
to require Appellants to pay for services inadequately performed or 
never undertaken. 
Appellee has attempted to divert attention from its non-
performance by discussing only what the proper remedy should be and 
by pretending that Appellee's only breach of the contract was its 
failure to provide evidence of adequate insurance. The law in Utah 
clearly holds that when a valid contract exists, a claim for unjust 
enrichment is improper. Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 
P. 2d at 578. In order for a contractor to recover on a 
construction contract, it must first establish its performance 
under the contract. Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 
19 80). The relation of the parties was governed by the contract 
and, even though certain terms of the contract were ambiguous, the 
trial court did not have the latitude to reform the parties' 
obligations in favor of a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial 
court's award of damages was error and should be vacated. 
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when the applicable statute requires an award. Appellant is 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party in an 
action under the Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute are also mandatory. 
There are several provisions addressing an award of attorney fees 
under the bond statute: 
In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to 
the prevailing party. These fees shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (3) (1993) . The foregoing provision 
specifically addresses the failure of a property owner to obtain a 
payment bond. A more general provision under the same chapter, 
however, mandates an award of fees to the prevailing party in all 
actions under the Bond Statute: 
In any suit upon a payment bond under this 
chapter, the court shall award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7) (emphasis added). The Bond Statute, 
thus, provides for mandatory attorney fees to a prevailing party in 
any action brought under the statute. 
Appellee has argued that it was proper for the trial 
court to deny fees altogether because Appellants' counsel "made no 
attempt to distinguish its services rendered on the unjust 
enrichment claim from the other two causes of action." (Brief of 
Appellee at 25.) That statement is inaccurate. Appellants' 
69654 13 
counsel submitted an affidavit of attorney's fees and costs 
itemizing the time spent on bringing its successful Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 111-114.) Appellee objected to an 
award of attorney fees because Appellants' counsel had not 
segregated the time with respect to causes of action. (R. 117.) 
Appellant's counsel explained and defended his request 
for fees in Appellant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to 
Proposed Judgment. (R. 122-24.) Appellants' counsel stated that 
the majority of his time spent on the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was spent on the mechanic lien argument and the bond 
argument. Indeed, Appellant's 10-page Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment contains only one page 
addressing the unjust enrichment cause of action. (R. 72-73.) The 
unjust enrichment argument is very simple and, unlike the 
mechanic's lien and bond arguments, it refers to no case law or 
statute. Research on the unjust enrichment case was confined to 
Black's Law Dictionary. (R. 72.) Appellant's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment does not even 
mention the unjust enrichment claim. (R. 96-99.) There is ample 
evidence in the pleadings themselves to indicate that Appellant's 
counsel spent virtually no time on the unjust enrichment cause of 
action and Appellants' counsel explained as much to the trial 
court. To fail to make an award altogether in the face of such 
evidence was an abuse of discretion. The issue of attorney fees 
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should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the 
appropriate fee. 
D. THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE VACATED, 
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest is available on 
liquidated amounts. It is generally unavailable in actions in 
equity because the amount of an award in equity is usually 
unliquidated until judgment is entered. Shoreline Development, 
Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Appellee has misstated the holding of Shoreline. That 
case does not "provide [] for an award of interest in unjust 
enrichment cases tried directly to the court." (Brief of Appellee 
at 2 7.) That issue was not before the court in Shoreline. The 
case was tried to a jury and, consequently, the Court of Appeals' 
decision focused on the risk of double recovery when the court 
cannot know whether the jury's award includes interest. Id. at 
211. In all equity cases, however, the trier of fact must use its 
discretion to determine the proper amount of the award. Thus, 
damages are usually, if not always, unliquidated at the time the 
cause of action arises and thus not subject to prejudgment 
interest. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "where damages are 
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy 
. . . the amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by 
the trier of fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment 
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interest is not allowed." Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 
P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added). In the present case, 
the amount of damages was not liquidated until judgment was 
entered. The trial court based its award on the grounds that 
"approximately" 10 percent of the work had been completed based on 
the architect's testimony of "less than 10 percent," although the 
court noted that "counsel did not tie him down to a figure." (R. 
803.) In fact, the trial court had already determined that the 
amount was not liquidated. (R. 299, Reporter's Transcript of 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Scheduling 
Conference at pp. 12-15; R. 128, Order of Partial Summary 
Judgment.) 
Finally, Appellee is simply wrong in stating that this is 
not a case of equity. Unjust enrichment sounds in equity and, for 
the reasons stated by the Court in Shoreline and Bjork, prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate in the present case. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD 
BE VACATED, 
Post-judgment interest is appropriate from the time 
judgment is "rendered." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 54(e). 
Appellee argues that "rendered" means verbally rendered from the 
bench. It has cited no case from any jurisdiction to support this 
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contention. Most courts, including Utah, hold that a judgment is 
"rendered" when it is entered.1 
Appellee has argued that because the trial court granted 
Appellee's motion to compel Appellants to prepare and file 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, post-judgment interest should 
run from the date that the Motion was granted. As explained in the 
Brief of Appellant, the delay in filing the proposed findings of 
fact was occasioned by Appellant's substitution of counsel. 
Appellee could have moved for sanctions, but did not. 
Finally, Appellee has argued that because the amount of 
post-judgement interest at issue here is small, it would not be 
unfair to allow the trial court's ruling to stand. (Brief of 
Appellee at 31.) The amount of interest is immaterial. The law 
does not permit post-judgment interest to run prior to the date 
judgment is entered and there is no reason that the law should not 
be followed in this case. The trial court's award of post-judgment 
interest should be vacated. 
1
 See Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 
(Utah Ct. App. 19 85) (post-judgment interest runs from the date of 
entry of new judgment, not from date of previous erroneous 
judgment); National Steel Construction Co. v. National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 543 P.2d 642 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (error 
to impose interest from the date of court's oral decision rather 
than from the date judgment was entered); Pure Gas & Chemical Co. 
v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993 (Wyo. 1974) (error to grant post-
judgment interest from the date of the verdict, rather than date 
judgment was entered). 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is not about fashioning a proper remedy. The 
major issue in this case is whether Appellee was entitled to any 
remedy at all. For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant, the award of damages was error and 
should be vacated. 
Under both the Mechanics' Lien Statute and the Bond 
Statute, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. There 
was sufficient evidence as to the amount of those fees and, while 
the trial court had discretion to determine the appropriate amount 
of attorney fees, it was an abuse of discretion to deny fees 
altogether. 
Finally, the award of prejudgment and post-judgment 
interest should be vacated because an award of damages was not 
warranted in this case. Even assuming the award of damages was 
proper, prejudgment interest is not available because the amount of 
damages was not liquidated until the Court entered judgment. Post-
judgment interest, if any, should run from the date judgment was 
entered and not before that date. 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in 
the Brief of Appellants, the award of damages and of prejudgment 
and post-judgment interest was contrary to law and should be 
vacated. The case should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to determine and award Appellants their reasonable 
69654 18 
attorney fees incurred in bringing their Motion for Partial Summary-
Judgment on the Mechanic's Lien Statute and the Bond Statute. 
4K 
DATED this ^T)" day of August, 1993. 





of and^  
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
WILLIAM J. EVANS, being duly sworn says that he is 
employed in the law offices of PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, attorneys 
for Appellants, that he has this day caused to be served by hand 
delivery two copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS and 
a copy of this Affidavit of Service to the following at the address 
shown below: 
Bruce J, Nelson 
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen 
215 S. State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
1993. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this day of August, 







iding at;"? / o A , \ / \ _*JL. JMlrflft 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SHEILA P. LAND 
201 South Main #1800 
Salt Laka City. Utah 84147 
My Commission Expires 
August 3.1997 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 10870 
* * * * * * * * 
This action, having been tried to the Court, and the 
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of coun-
sel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the follow-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and 
did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act 
000214 
as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of 
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the contract between the par-
ties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on 
defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant 
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's ser-
vices in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that 
defendants had experienced problems with prior general contrac-
tors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfac-
tory performance. Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a 
meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting 
performance of the contract. 
4. The Court finds the parties intended and the con-
tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into 
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate 
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract. 
5. The Court finds that plaintiff represented to 
defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance 
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the con-
tract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in 
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only 
-2-
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for $300# 000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October 
24, 1989. 
6. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 
1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael 
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage 
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the 
contract. 
7. The court find that defendants terminated plain-
tiff's services on October 2, 1990. 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-
tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor 
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from 
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract. 
9. The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit 
of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through 




CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the subject contract was 
ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a 
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral con-
tract between the parties. 
2. The Court concludes that the contract can be 
interpreted as written. 
3. The Court concludes that given the amount of the 
subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had 
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for 
the project, but did not. 
4. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a 
material breach of the contract. 
5. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its 
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability 
insurance. 
6. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very 
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction 
project the attention that it required under the contract and 
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect. 
-4-
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7. The Court concludes that defendants are not in 
breach of the contract in any way. 
8. With respect to plaintiff's Unjust Enrichment 
Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of 
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory. The 
Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of 
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plain-
tiff was on the job. 
9. The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it 
should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration con-
templated under the contract because it spent three months on the 
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the 
residence as contemplated under the contract. The Court finds 
that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the 
facts. 
10. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrich-
ment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants, 
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for 
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for 
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber. 
11. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants' 
-5-
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
east side retaining wall. 
12. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants' 
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
west side concrete steps. 
13. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants' 
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams. 
14. The Court concludes plaintiff is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, 
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's 
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plain-
tiffs1 Motion to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992. 
DATED this ^ day of CA^C » , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
1UCE J. NELSON 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10870 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
BOOKNN PAGE 7 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 
and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon 
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4 
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in direct-
ing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1 
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotia-
tions for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an off-
set the following awards to defendants: 
a. The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' east side retaining wall; 
b. The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' west side concrete steps; and 
c. The sum of $559 which represents defendants' 
costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials; 
2. That defendants are not entitled to attorneys' 
fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; 
3. That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of 
court itemized as follows : 
a. Filing fee, $75,00; 
b. Service of process fees, $32.25; 
c. Kurzet deposition; $311.15; 
-2-
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d. Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and 
e. Expert witness fee, $25.00. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-
est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for 
the period from November 1, 1990 to April 17, 1992, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and 
5. That defendant's counterclaims are hereby dis-
missed with prejudice. 
day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JRUCE J. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
7 Z. 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
a**. 
A G R E E M E N T 
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing 
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for 
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN 
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH. 
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee 
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made 
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this 
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the 
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if 
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost 
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost 
of such additional work. 
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or 
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing 
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the 
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that 
the billing is true and correct. 
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result 
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above, 
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause 
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly 
to Contractors account, however, when such payment is made, Owner 
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated 
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed 
upon Owner's return. 
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot 
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and 
signatures of both parties. 
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the 
drawings and no change will be made without the express written 
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change 
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the 
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the 
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by 
both Owner and Contractor. 
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule 
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15, 
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been 
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding 
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of 
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document 
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule. 
The residence was designed through the cooperative effort of 
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to 
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate, 
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued 
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be 
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the 
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable 
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or 
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed 
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred. 
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on 
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain 
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to 
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if 
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on 
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to 
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of 
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because 
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising 
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail 
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time 
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates 
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other 
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed 
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be 
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as 
applicable. 
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor 
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of 
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a 
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner. 
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for 
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of 
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is 
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10 
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of 
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The 
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the 
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under 
this contract is covered. 
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that 
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur 
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess 
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given 
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work 
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected, 
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement 
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly 
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising 
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever 
oaotfio 
other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per 
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement. 
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or 
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be 
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not 
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work 
which may in the opinion of Architect, Contractor, Inspector, 
Engineer, members of Owner#s family or others be deemed necessary 
or desirable. 
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of 
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to 
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the 
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's 
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential 
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in 
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability 
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or 
to any consequence arrising therefrom. 
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the 
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems 
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of 
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not 
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or 
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by 
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are 
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers 
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the 
use of substandard quality materials. 
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the 
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as 
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be 
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C. 
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations, 
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be 
reached on any given day. 
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word 
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor. 
Entered into this Third Day Of July, 1990 at Park City, Utah. 
<.'<*,. T .- / ^ s £_- . . 




C H A N G E O R D E R 
In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot 
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perforin 
the following specific work and to supply the materials and 
services as needed for such performance. 
WORK DESCRIPTION 
UNDERSTANDINGS 
The cost differential of the above described work shall be: 
The affect on schedule of the described work shall be: 
APPROVALS 

























TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR 
Office: P.O. Box 11074 
Salt Lake City, UT 
84147 
Richard Allen Tel. 801-973-7888 
Michael Kent 
Park City Mobil 














PO Box 680670 
1250 Pinnacle Drive 
Park City, UT 68048 
Tel. 503-888-9269 
Fax 503-888-6055 
PO Box 5039 
Charleston Station 















Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992) 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
ADDENDUM D.2 
Utah Rule of AppeUate Procedure 32 (1992) 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
ADDENDUM D.3 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7) 
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this 
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party. 1989 
ADDENDUM D.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992) 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment 
bond — Liability. 
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond 
is liable to each person who performed labor or ser-
vice or supplied equipment or materials under the 
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or ser-
vice performed or the equipment or materials fur-
nished up to but not exceeding the contract price. 
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be 
commenced after the expiration of one year after the 
day on which the last of the labor or service was per-
formed or the equipment or material was supplied by 
the person. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the 
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. ira 
ADDENDUM D.5 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992) 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to re-
cover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 1961 
